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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GARTH, Circuit Judge. 
 
The District Court convicted Appellant Robert Santiago 
("Santiago") on federal drug violations and subsequently 
sentenced him to the required mandatory minimum of ten 
years imprisonment. In this appeal, Santiago contends that 
the District Court erred in denying his motion for a 
downward departure from the mandatory minimum 
sentence pursuant to section 5K2.0 of the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines ("Sentencing Guidelines"). We will 
affirm the sentence given by the District Court. 
 
I 
 
On February 18, 1998, federal agents recorded two 
telephone conversations in which two men -- Santiago and 
Angel Quinones -- discussed a cocaine transaction. The 
next day, these same agents recorded three new 
conversations through which the Santiago and Quinones 
disclosed the specific location of the transaction-- 
Quinones's home in the 2100 block of Haworth Street in 
Philadelphia. 
 
Later that same day, Santiago arrived at Quinones's 
home, and began to converse with Quinones as federal 
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agents listened nearby. After Santiago presented Quinones 
with $12,000, Quinones provided Santiago with a kilogram 
of cocaine. The federal agents arrested Santiago once the 
transaction was complete and he had left Quinones's home. 
 
On March 24, 1998, a federal grand jury filed an 
indictment against Santiago, alleging violations of 21 U.S.C. 
S 841(a)(1), which prohibits the possession of a controlled 
substance with the intent to distribute. Santiago initially 
pled not guilty, but later entered a plea of guilty to this 
charge. At the time, Santiago had been serving a term of 
probation from a prior Pennsylvania drug conviction, and 
as such, his federal offense operated as a probation 
violation. Judge Legrome Davis of the Court of Common 
Pleas for the City of Philadelphia sentenced Santiago to a 
term of two to five years in the state prison system. 
 
The District Court held Santiago's federal sentencing 
hearing on February 16, 1999. Although the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines provided for a sentencing range of 
between 70-87 months incarceration, a prior federal drug 
conviction subjected Santiago to a mandatory minimum 
sentence of ten years in prison. See 21 U.S.C. 
S 841(b)(1)(B). Santiago moved the District Court for a 
downward departure from Sentencing Guidelines range and 
the mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to section 
5K2.0 of the Sentencing Guidelines, arguing that he had 
been the victim of a shooting accident that initially left him 
paralyzed. Santiago has regained the use of his legs, but 
continues to experience medical difficulties. 
 
Although sympathetic to Santiago's plight, the District 
Court, in an order filed on February 17, 1999, sentenced 
Santiago to 120 months imprisonment, to be served 
concurrently with his state court sentence, and eight years 
of supervised release. Santiago filed a timely notice of 
appeal. 
 
II 
 
A 
 
At the outset, we must determine whether we possess the 
authority to entertain Santiago's claim of error. We have 
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repeatedly held that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear a 
challenge to a District Court's ruling on a motion pursuant 
to section 5K2.0 of the Sentencing Guidelines if the District 
Court rested such a ruling on an exercise of discretion. See, 
e.g., United States v. McBroom, 124 F.3d 533, 541 n.9 (3d 
Cir. 1997); United States v. Mummert, 34 F.3d 201, 205 (3d 
Cir. 1994). To the contrary, if the District Court "believe[s] 
that a departure was legally impermissible under the 
guidelines," we may exercise "jurisdiction to determine 
whether the court's understanding of the guidelines was 
correct." McBroom, 124 F.3d at 541. 
 
In this matter, the District Court explicitly stated that it 
believed that a downward departure, pursuant to section 
5K2.0, from a mandatory minimum sentence was improper 
as a matter of law. App. at 32-33. As a result, we may 
entertain Santiago's challenge to the District Court's ruling. 
Because the District Court's ruling therefore rests upon a 
particular construction of the Sentencing Guidelines, we 
exercise plenary review. See McBroom, 124 F.3d at 541; 
United States v. Oser, 107 F.3d 1080, 1083 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
B 
 
A District Court must generally provide sentences in 
concert with the provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines. 
See 18 U.S.C. S 3553(a)(4)(A). The court may, however, 
deviate from the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range if 
"there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a 
kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into 
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating 
the guidelines." Id. S 3553(b). The United States Sentencing 
Commission explicitly added this statutory provision to the 
Sentencing Guidelines at section 5K2.0. 
 
Although section 5K2.0 consistently speaks in terms of a 
departure from the Guidelines, using such a phrase no less 
than eight times, see U.S.S.G. S 5K2.0, Santiago argues 
that the provision also authorized the District Court to 
effectuate a downward departure from the minimum 
statutory sentence mandated for the crime of which he was 
convicted. We do not agree. Any deviation from the 
statutory minimum sentence can only be had through the 
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specific procedures established through 18 U.S.C. 
SS 3553(e), 3553(f), which are not applicable here. 
 
At least four of our sister circuits concur. In United 
States v. Polanco, 53 F.3d 893 (8th Cir. 1995), the Eighth 
Circuit found that "[s]ection 3553(b) and guideline section 
5K2.0 do not permit departure below the statutory 
mandatory minimum . . . without a section 3553(e) motion 
or the unconstitutional refusal of one . . . the District Court 
had no authority to depart below the statutory minimum." 
Id. at 897. Further, the Seventh Circuit has held that "a 
departure from a minimum sentence prescribed by statute 
... was available only on motion of the prosecutor under 
section 3553(e)." United States v. Brigham, 977 F.2d 317, 
320 (7th Cir. 1992) (emphasis added). Both the Fourth and 
Ninth Circuits have issued similar holdings. See United 
States v. Daniels, No. 98-4732, 1999 WL 496594, at *1 (4th 
Cir. July 13, 1999); United States v. Valente, 961 F.2d 133 
(9th Cir. 1992); cf. Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S. 120, 
126-27 (1996) (holding that a District Court may not 
provide a downward departure from a mandatory minimum 
sentence through the auspices of U.S.S.G. S 5K1.1). 
 
In support of his arguments of error, Santiago only cites 
the Supreme Court's decision in Koon v. United States, 518 
U.S. 81 (1996). Koon, however, only reinforces what the 
plain language of section 5K2.0 explicitly states-- that a 
District Court may depart from the applicable Guidelines 
range if "certain aspects of the case [are] found unusual 
enough for it to fall outside the heartland of cases in the 
Guidelines." Id. at 98. Because the instant matter concerns 
the application of a mandatory minimum sentence, rather 
than the Guidelines, Koon provides Santiago with little 
assistance. 
 
Both the plain language of the relevant statutory and 
Guidelines provisions, the context in which Congress has 
placed such provisions, and the jurisprudence of a number 
of our sister circuits all point in one direction: a District 
Court lacks the authority to lower a mandatory minimum 
sentence via section 5K2.0 of the Guidelines. We will 
therefore affirm the sentence imposed by the District Court. 
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